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Ideological Foundations of British Non-Intervention in the
Spanish Civil War: Foreign Office Perceptions of Political
Polarisation in Spain, 1931-1936
Scott Ramsay
School of History, Michael Sadler Building, University of Leeds, Leeds, Yorkshire, UK
ABSTRACT
In response to the outbreak of the Spanish Civil War in 1936,
the British government adopted and maintained a policy of
strict non-intervention throughout the conflict. Previous com-
mentators, to varying degrees, have suggested this policy was
largely a product of British hostility towards the Spanish
Republic and designed to facilitate a victory for the military
rebels who would subdue threats of a communist revolution.
This analysis argues that historians have exaggerated British
concerns about communism and that Britain saw the Republic
as a viable political project that it wanted to succeed. Rather
than focusing on British perceptions of only left-wing groups in
Spain, this analysis also incorporates perceptions of the
extreme right and fascist groups. British concerns about
Spain’s political polarisation laid the foundations of the policy
of non-intervention, which sought to avert risks of the conflict
escalating and solidifying the broader ideological polarisation
occurring in Europe during the 1930s.
On 10 August 1936, just over three weeks after the outbreak of the Spanish
Civil War, Labour peer Lord Strabolgi wrote an article for the Daily Herald in
which he accused the British government of pursuing a policy of 'malevolent
neutrality’ towards the besieged Spanish Republic. Lord Halifax, a confidant
of Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain and at the time lord privy seal, wrote
personally to Strabolgi upon reading the article. ‘I am moved’, began Halifax,
‘to write a line in protest against [your] concluding paragraphs’. Halifax
insisted the objectives of British policy were to localise the conflict to prevent
it from developing into a ‘first-class international crisis’ and avert assistance
from outside to both sides, which ‘would only result in a prolongation of the
disastrous struggle’. ‘Surely by no stretch of the imagination’, Halifax con-
cluded, ‘can our efforts to pursue this double end be described by the terms
“malevolent neutrality”’.1 This is how British politicians and Foreign Office
officials would justify their policy vis-à-vis Spain during and after the
conflict.2
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It is Strabolgi’s phrase, however, that historians writing on British diplomacy
concerning Spain have predominantly taken up and linked to British hostility
towards the Spanish Republic that developed leading to the outbreak of civil war
in July 1936. The strongest advocate of this interpretation even used Strabolgi’s
phrase as the title of his major contribution to the historiography.3 This analysis
from an American pen examining British and American diplomacy in Spain
between 1931 and 1936 suggests this hostility developed gradually from the
Republic’s inception in 1931 and became more acute after the election of the
Popular Front government in February 1936. Accordingly, when civil war broke
out in July 1936, ideological concerns took precedence over strategic factors and
the British government therefore quickly opted for a ‘better dead than Red’
response.4 The principal problem with this exegesis is that it pays almost no
attention to British strategic concerns or the wider context of general
appeasement.5 Similarly, a Spanish assessment, despite considering British stra-
tegic constraints and appeasement, suggests a fear of communism in Spain and
a general aversion to the Republic, especially after February 1936, led to the
British government adopting this policy and pursuing a ‘benevolent neutrality’
towards the rebels.6 An earlier British view argued that London made its initial
decision to remain neutral against a backdrop of fears that a communist revolu-
tion would overthrow the Spanish government after the turbulent breakdown of
law and order in spring 1936.7
In general, historians have supported their arguments with examples of
British antipathy for left-wing elements in Spain, but they have often overlooked
British perceptions of the extreme right in light of the growing fascist threat in
Europe in the 1930s.8 The American analysis, for instance, draws on examples of
negative comments made by Foreign Office Western Department clerks about
left-wing groups in Spain and conflates their opinions with official ‘Whitehall’
policy. Yet high-ranking Foreign Office officials seldom wrote in the minutes on
despatches sent from British diplomats in Spain, and it is unlikely that they read
much of this correspondence until spring and summer 1936. This presents
problems when considering official British perceptions of Spain during this
period, because whilst high-ranking Foreign Office officials said very little
about Spain compared to discussions prompted by despatches from Berlin or
Rome, British politicians said even less. Of course, what the Western
Department officials who digested reports from British diplomats in Spain
between 1931 and 1936 did say is important because they would be an important
source of information for policy-makers once they began to take more of an
interest in Spanish affairs after spring 1936.
Through an analysis of the perceptions of Spain in the Western Department
and British diplomatic staff in Spain, this examination argues that historians
have exaggerated British hostility towards left-wing government in Spain before
the outbreak of civil war. As the civil war almost immediately transformed into
an international conflict that confronted broader British foreign policy
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objectives, there are many difficulties in linking British perceptions only of left-
wing government in Spain with Britain’s immediate adoption of a policy of non-
intervention. Accordingly, a focus on British perceptions of political polarisation
in Spain until the outbreak of civil war demonstrates that both the ForeignOffice
and British ambassadors at Madrid – George Grahame (1928–1935) and Henry
Chilton (1935–1939) – considered the Second Republic a viable political project
that they wanted to succeed, even after the election of the Popular Front in
February 1936.9
For the Republic’s success, the Foreign Office desired a Spanish govern-
ment inclusive of right and left-wing elements and one able to maintain
stability in the face of threats from both the left and right. The political
culture cultivated in Britain since the First World War when labour militancy
had presented the British government with similar problems – albeit on
a smaller scale – to those that threatened stability in Spain between 1931
and 1936 arguably influenced such desires. Indeed, Stanley Baldwin, prime
minister of the Conservative-dominated National Government at the out-
break of civil war in Spain, had played a pivotal role in resolving the General
Strike of 1926 during his second term as prime minister.10 The experience of
the tumultuous 1920s instilled British politicians and civil servants with an
appreciation of the fact that improved living standards for the working class
provided a more stable political environment in which general economic
progress and prosperity were possible.
Bearing this in mind, the British political elite’s emphasis on respect for
Parliament and the institution of democracy, as well as attempts made by
Baldwin and the Conservative Party to incorporate the labour movement
within Conservative definitions democracy, played out in assessments of
political polarisation in Spain.11 Oppression of the working class in Spain
and a reluctance to introduce reforms to improve living and working condi-
tions would only lead to unrest and violence. Although by summer 1936 it
was clear that a stable, democratic government was no longer a realistic
possibility, there was no consensus in the Foreign Office on what political
regime was most desirable. In this sense, there is a need not to conflate the
opinions of some within the British government and Foreign Office before
the outbreak of civil war with the opinions prompted by reports of atrocities
committed in the republican zone during the first weeks of the conflict.12 The
perceptions of British diplomats in Spain and their colleagues at the Foreign
Office before July 1936, rather, provide insight into the ideological founda-
tions of the policy of non-intervention adopted in response to the outbreak
of the Spanish Civil War.
After the fall of the Primo de Rivera dictatorship (1923–1930), the right in
Spain stood in disarray whilst left-wing opinion overwhelmingly favoured a -
Republic.13 Although some right-wing and conservative groups were prepared
to accept the new regime in principle, the Republic failed to consolidate
46 S. RAMSAY
a cohesive social base that would have paved the way for the introduction of
moderate reforms. Instead, attempts to consolidate itself through structural
reforms of education, land, and the military solidified significant right-wing
opposition almost immediately.14 Francisco Largo Caballero, leader of the
Socialist Unión General de Trabajadores [UGT] and minister of Labour, intro-
duced a series of agrarian reforms aimed at improving living and working
conditions that would be a source of contention and a major cause of the
coup in 1936.15
Whilst Largo Caballero’s reforms provoked the hostility of many landowners,
reforms relating to the Spanish military and Catholic Church solidified opposi-
tion to the regime amongst other powerful sectors of Spanish society. Manuel
Azaña, theminister ofWar, attempted tomodernise themilitary by reducing the
inflated officer corps and making cuts to save money.16 Catholic opposition to
the Republic hardened early on after left-wing groups burned a number of
churches in Madrid in May 1931 without any serious opposition from the
government. The announcement of the proposed Article 26 of the
Constitution, which sought to prohibit the Church from engaging in education,
further exacerbated the religious question. In summary, the Republic’s reforms
consolidated the hostility of landowners, large swathes of the military, and
Catholics from the outset.17 As a result, these groups began calling for the
overthrow of the Republic and likened it to the weak Alexander Kerensky
government in Russia after the fall of the tsar in 1917.
Historians have suggested the British government also held these concerns of
a Kerensky-style government in Spain.18 However, it was the uncertainty of the
Spanish situation, rather than the character of the new regime, that influenced
early negative perceptions of the Republic within the Foreign Office. Grahame
told the Foreign Office on the day of the Republic’s proclamation that the
‘situation within the last hour or two has developed in the most alarming
manner and the regime has collapsed’.19 Due to family ties between the British
and Spanish royal families, there was concern about the plight of King Alfonso
XIII and his family, but Grahame soon informed his colleagues in London that
the regime change had occurred with no bloodshed and that the royals had safely
arrived in France after fleeing Madrid.20 When Grahame assured the Foreign
Office that ‘the new republican government are evidently desirous of doing all in
their power to maintain the movement on peaceful lines’, Arthur Wiggin, first
secretary in the Western Department, asked his colleagues, ‘will there be such
unanimity when the government get to business? There is almost no chance of it,
one may predict with reasonable certainty’. ‘The future’, he concluded, ‘is as
obscure as ever’.21
This uncertainty delayed recognition of the Republic for a week after its
proclamation. The new Spanish government prompted the question of recogni-
tion and led to the Foreign Office’s first detailed discussion on the matter.
Charles Howard Smith, a private secretary and later assistant under-secretary,
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favoured moving forward with recognition but was concerned that ‘it is not
absolutely certain that the [municipal election results] showed a republican
majority. There was a strong republican majority in the towns but we know
nothing of the country districts… . Moreover, it seems quite likely that the new
government may have stormy times ahead’.22 An assistant under-secretary, Sir
George Mounsey, agreed: ‘we must know a great deal more about the internal
reactions ensuing from this first landslide victory before we can accord official
recognition’. In a better position to judge the situation, Grahame was more
enthusiastic than his counterparts in Whitehall and urged the Foreign Office to
move quickly with recognition:
It is by no means outside the bounds of reasonable possibility that a republican
regime may consolidate itself in Spain … . The Republican government is at
present being carried on a flood tide of enthusiastic popular support … . News
of the attitude of Great Britain towards it will be eagerly awaited and future
relations between the two countries will doubtless be influenced thereby … .
Great Britain has long held a leading position in the estimation of Spanish public
opinion and our national interests both political and commercial may suffer if
impression be given that Great Britain is imbued with a prejudice against new
regime which is not manifested by other governments23
The British government formally recognised the republican regime on 22 -
April.24 Despite somewhat overdue, such a delay was not unusual given the
dramatic change in the style of regime, the uncertainty surrounding the situa-
tion, dynastic links with the royal family, and the absence of a constitution.25
In the months following recognition of the Republic, there was further uncer-
tainty surrounding which parties would find representation in the Constituent
Cortes after general elections in June. Envisioning the Cortes composed primarily
of Socialists and Republicans and led byAlejandro Lerroux, the foreignminister of
the provisional government, as prime minister,26 the Foreign Office regarded
Lerroux as an ideal moderating influence between the multitude of competing
political parties and ideologies in Spain. As Lerroux stated, ‘I am a conservative
when confronted with anarchy, and a revolutionary when confronted with the
forces of stagnation’.27 It soon became clear that the Partido Socialista Obrero
Españolwas the largest party and with support by republican groups in the Cortes.
Accordingly, Grahame informed the ForeignOffice, ‘the futureCortes will be of an
advanced democratic but not revolutionary character’.28 Wiggin remarked, ‘what
has happened so far must be regarded as distinctly satisfactory. The elements of
moderation seem at present in ascendant, and despite all the forecasts, broken
heads seem to have been relatively few’.29
Some in the Foreign Office also recognised political cleavages amongst the
various left-wing groups in Spain, such as socialists, communists, and anar-
chists. When Norman King, the British consul-general in Barcelona, wrongly
reported that communists had caused disturbances in the Catalan capital,
Alexander Leeper, who in August 1933 would be appointed head of the
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Western Department, merely noted, ‘it was the anarchists, not the commu-
nists, who caused the trouble’.30 Indeed, the biggest threat to stability came
from the anarchists who did not participate in parliamentary politics and
were responsible for persistent strikes and disturbances in Spain throughout
the year.31 Wiggin noted his concern, ‘the fact that the extremist labour
organisation [UGT] stands aloof from the parliamentary struggle is a factor
in Spanish politics which must always be borne in mind’.32
Due to these anarchist threats, the Foreign Office could only hope that
‘whatever prime minister takes office will show an iron hand in dealing with
such situations’.33 Firm leadership took on special importance in Spain not
only because of the widespread strikes that occurred during 1931, but also
due to the need to steer the Cortes in the debates surrounding the new
Spanish constitution.34 As mentioned above, the articles relating to the
religious question were extremely controversial, and these proposals alone
served to alienate large swathes of Catholics. By challenging the influence of
the Church, Leeper noted how the Republic was ‘getting into deep water. It is
embarking on an attempt to deal with the status of the Church … I think we
should hear of a monarchist reaction in 1932’.35
It was amidst the debates on the Constitution that Azaña, leader of the
republican party, Acción Republicana, and still minister of War, emerged as
the dominant figure in Spanish politics. The debates surrounding the reli-
gious question led to the resignation of the cabinet, paving the way for him to
preside over a new one. At the time, the Foreign Office knew little about
Azaña but soon came to respect him as a robust and highly skilled politician
despite right-wing claims he would be a Spanish Kerensky. In February 1932,
for example, after a botched insurrectionary attempt by anarchists, Grahame
told the Foreign Office of how Azaña’s government had ‘taken the drastic
step of using powers under the Law for the Defence of the Republic to deport
ringleaders of the movement without trial to Spanish Guinea’.36 Passed in
October 1931, this law allowed the government to take extreme measures
when dealing with threats to political stability.37 Over the following year, it
proved a useful tool for the Azaña government as threats to political stability
came from both the extreme left and right.
The most significant attempt to destabilise the Republic came in
August 1932 when José Sanjurjo y Sacanell, a prestigious general who had
fought in Morocco and would later play a leading role in the July 1936
military rebellion, attempted to bring down the Republic through a -
pronunciamiento.38 The government quickly suppressed the rising in
Madrid and soon after in Seville, where Sanjurjo led a force of 6,000 troops.
At the same time, anarchists around Seville took the opportunity to cause
trouble of their own, and government troops sent to suppress Sanjurjo’s
revolt then had to subdue an anarchist rising. Grahame noted how ‘it is
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unfortunate that one more “pronunciamiento”, however futile, has to be
added to the list former ones’.39
The Sanjurjo revolt bolstered Azaña’s role as a bulwark against attempts
from both the left and right to destabilise the Republic.40 Grahame gave the
Foreign Office his thoughts on what would have happened if the Sanjurjo
coup had been successful. Not only would it have ‘damaged irretrievably
Republican institutions’, it would have ‘obliterated ordinary constitutional
and parliamentary government in Spain’ and led to ‘another edition of the
Primo de Rivera coup d’état with a general in charge without any political
acumen’.41 This, Grahame emphasised, would have ‘probably involved
a return to the unfortunate conditions which occurred so often in the nine-
teenth century in Spain, with disastrous consequences for the stability and
orderly progress of the country’.42 Azaña’s uncompromising attitude towards
attacks from both the left and right led Wiggin to consider him ‘an absolute
politician’ and ‘the best man one could wish for Spain at this critical
juncture’.43
In fact, Azaña’s success rectified some of the negative views of the Republic
held by some in the Foreign Office in April 1931. After suppression of the
Sanjurjo revolt, for instance, Grahame complained to the Foreign Office about
Eugene de Caux, a Times correspondent in Madrid, who had been writing
unduly critical reports of the Republic. For Grahame, the correspondent ignored
‘the fact that the Republican Government, ever since the revolution, has been
engaged in a continuous struggle to preserve the safety of the new regime from
both the extreme left and the extreme right’. The extreme right, he went on, had
‘been working hard to damage and if possible overturn the Republic’. Grahame
also complained that de Caux’s articles ignored the severity with which the
extreme left was treated but was quick to fire criticism at any negative treatment
of ‘priests and aristocrats’.44 Leeper agreed; the tone of de Caux’s articles was
‘unfairly critical of the Republican regime which has done less badly than I, for
one, in my ignorance expected’.45
Azaña’s job became increasingly difficult over the next year, however, as
right-wing opposition to the government increased and unified. José María
Gil Robles, a deputy in the Cortes for Salamanca, became the leader of this
movement officially united under the Confederación Española de Derechas
Autónomas [CEDA]. CEDA was a right-wing mass Catholic party founded in
March 1933 and made up of a broad coalition of right-wing groups.46 As
leader of this party, Gil Robles sought to take over the Republic through legal
means using the parliamentary system.47 However, CEDA increasingly took
on an authoritarian character that resembled the fascist movements of
Germany and Italy.48 By August 1933, six months after Adolf Hitler’s rise
to power, Grahame spoke of an ‘incipient Fascist movement in Spain’ that
took inspiration from the successes of the German and Italian regimes. He
predicted that eventually the Azaña government would fall, and a likely result
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would be another dictatorship along fascist lines supported by ‘the adherents
of Primo de Rivera, whose regime was already a species of fascism inspired
by the Italian regime’.49 After increasing instability and right-wing unwill-
ingness to do anything other than oppose the government, President Niceto
Alcalá-Zamora dissolved the Cortes and called a general election for
November 1933.50 The situation did not inspire optimism in the Foreign
Office. Leeper noted, ‘the whole incident may prove calamitous to the
Spanish Republic. The elections may lead to a monarchist reaction & if so
conceivably to serious disorders’.51
Divisions between left-wing parties on one hand and the ability of Gil
Robles to rally the right behind the defence of ‘religion, homeland, order,
family, work and property’ on the other led to CEDA becoming the largest
party in the Cortes.52 Fearing that a government headed by Gil Robles would
only further arouse republican fervour, Alcalá-Zamora opted for a centrist-
government led by Lerroux, which Gil Robles’ party supported. However,
CEDA’s strength in the Cortes allowed the party frequently to effect cabinet
reshuffles and wield significant influence over the direction of government
policies.53 It prompted Grahame to warn the Foreign Office that if the right-
wing parties used ‘their majority unduly and without prudence a dangerous
situation might arise’ with the Socialists, who were ‘extremely hostile to
Lerroux and likely to oppose him in every way if he were in power and
allied to any party of the right’. He felt this course particularly dangerous
because ‘in their opposition they would have behind them all the industrial
proletariat’.54 Grahame hoped that in towns and cities that required a second
ballot, the left would realise the importance of putting aside differences and
uniting to ‘redress the swing to the right’.55 The Foreign Office acknowledged
this risk of further polarisation. Charles Stirling, a clerk, wrote how the ‘fate
of Spain is now largely in the hands of Señor Robles and the Catholics’. But
‘if they insist on taking office themselves and reforming the constitution
there will be a head-on clash between them and the socialists and both sides
are already hinting at a resort to revolutionary measures if they cannot get
their way by constitutional methods’.56
The forecasts of Grahame and his colleagues in London eventually
unfolded. During the following year, the Spanish government failed to
maintain order and the Foreign Office and Grahame held it responsible for
the deterioration of the political situation. Grahame noted how ‘the Lerroux
cabinet shows little life and seems to have no drive or purpose’, which
provoked agitation in left-wing groups. Stirling observed how Spain seemed
‘to be drifting slowly towards an inevitable struggle between the extremes of
the Left and Right’.57 Indeed, when circumstances forced Lerroux to assem-
ble a new cabinet and include more right-wing elements, the Foreign Office
was concerned the new cabinet would only lead to the right-wing elements
growing ‘more exacting in their demands’. It might have provoked more
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serious demonstrations and outbreaks of violence ‘by the communists and
the socialists leading possibly to a demand by the Right for a “strong”
government of a dictatorial character’.58 Grahame weighed in with his
assessment that the goal of the right was ‘to advance by degrees towards
a fuller control of the government’, but that the ‘whole proletariat’ would be
ready to resort to violence ‘if the reactionary parties take undue advantage of
their parliamentary predominance’.59
Parallels exist with the British Conservative Party’s active efforts to avoid
political polarisation in Britain during the 1920s and early 1930s by attempt-
ing to incorporate the socialist Labour Party and movement. Whilst the
Liberal Party retained some central ground in Britain until the start of the
1930s, the moderate centre in Spain eroded rapidly as extremists of both the
left and right grew more exacting in their demands on the government. In
the first two years of the Republic, this situation presented fewer problems
for Azaña than it did for his opponents. Indeed, whilst facing problems from
both the left and right, Azaña was able to incorporate more left-wing
elements than the string of governments in power after November 1933.
According to Grahame’s appraisal, ‘the fundamental trouble [since the
November 1933 elections] is the antagonism between the whole Spanish
proletariat and Sr. Lerroux’. Under Azaña, conversely, the ‘moderate socia-
lists were in the cabinet and supported the [government] in suppressing
extremist labour agitation: but now the situation is very different and much
more disturbing’.60
The Foreign Office concurred with Grahame and believed the solution
would be a government representative of both left and right-wing interests.
In an assessment of the development of Spanish politics between 1931 and
1934, for example, Stirling concluded that as long as reactionaries refrained
from pushing the government to a ‘pronounced measure of reaction’, there
was ‘hope that a balance between the interests of the Right and the Left may
eventually be found by parliamentary means’.61 Again, this reflects the
political culture in Britain cultivated during the 1920s and early 1930s,
adhered to by virtually all of Britain’s political elite. As Conservative Party
leader, Baldwin believed the appeal of Labour to be too powerful and con-
stant, and that only a positive and inclusive response could counter it. For
Baldwin, successful resistance to revolution from the Labour left also
required opposition to reaction from the Conservative right.62 However,
Gil Robles was unwilling to compromise with the left and withdrew
CEDA’s support for the government. The result, as he intended, was to
secure ministerial positions for CEDA members. Perceiving this development
as one more step in an attempt to establish a fascist dictatorship in Spain,
left-wing groups launched a revolutionary strike. The lack of planning
ensured the government was quickly able to suppress the rising in cities
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such as Madrid and Barcelona.63 In the northern region of Asturias, however,
it was initially successful and lasted for a number of weeks.
Still, the swift suppression of the revolt relieved ForeignOffice concerns about
a communist revolution in Spain, but focus soon shifted to the harsh repression
meted out by the military authorities, especially in Asturias.64 One concern in
the Western Department was that repression could not be ‘a good foundation
for a moderate government which is what is really required to consolidate the
Republic’.65 Stirling noted that the ‘consequences [of the revolt] are depressing
in spite of the government’s victory’, as ‘liberals of all shades have been crushed
and discredited’.66 He went on, ‘the triumph of the right may give Spain at least
some months of orderly government. But Spain is in need of progress in many
ways and the fact that the progressive forces are now heralded as potential
enemies of law and order cannot make for peaceful development in the long
run’. Indeed, the press launched an atrocity campaign, the object of which was,
according to Grahame, ‘to create a sensation of horror in Spanish public opinion
as to cause socialists and communists, etc. to be regarded as outside the pale of
humanity’ and sweep away with a ‘flood of reprobation’ anyone ‘previously
associated with them’.67
The Asturias rising would have a profound impact on the polarisation of
Spanish politics over the subsequent two years.68 Towards the end of 1935, right-
wing parties in Spain attempted to alleviate British pessimism about the political
situation. For instance, in November 1935, Gil Robles met Chilton, Grahame’s
successor, assuring him that he would ‘not countenance any action towards
a dictatorship’ and that was he determined ‘to attain complete power only by
strictly legal and democratic methods’.69 However, the Foreign Office doubted
Gil Robles and took for granted rumours that he was taking part in plots for
a military rebellion.70 Gil Robles lent support to these rumours when he met
Chilton again in December to speak about the political situation in Spain and
share his thoughts on the likely outcome of another election. The CEDA leader
told Chilton that the extreme left would sweep the elections in Barcelona,
Madrid, and everywhere south of the capital; and the result would be
a ‘revolution more bloody than the French and Russian revolutions’. In his
meetings with Gil Robles, Chilton doubted the CEDA leader’s sincerity, warning
the Foreign Office that a successful coup would allow him to ‘set up a regime
similar to that existing in Italy today’. Regarding Gil Robles’ ominous forecasts
for the next election, Chilton concluded, ‘I cannot quite credit Gil Robles’s fears,
but one can only wait and see’.71
By the end of 1935, cracks were beginning to show in the relationship between
Gil Robles and the monarchists, upon whom much of the CEDA’s support
rested. According to Chilton, the monarchists were having misgivings that Gil
Robles was more ‘interested in forging a base for a fascist republic’ than in
forwarding the interests of the Church and the monarchy.72 Meanwhile, the
parties of the left – not only the moderate parties, but also the anarchists and
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communists – were resolving their differences and, in mid-January 1936, issued
a manifesto proclaiming they had achieved identity of aims and interests and
were going to co-operate at the elections as a Popular Front coalition. Stirling
noted how this manifesto was ‘not quite so blood curdling’ as the Right had
made out but doubted such a coalition would be able to co-operate harmo-
niously even with a majority in the Cortes.73
Prior the election, the Foreign Office was more concerned about the
reaction of the losing side rather than displaying a preference for either left
or right. Warnings continued flowing in from right-wing groups, as well as
the deposed Alfonso XIII, residing in Italy. He told Eric Drummond, the
ambassador at Rome, that regardless of which side won the election, there
would be a revolution in Spain. The risk, he warned, came particularly from
the communists who numbered some 300,000 and were well armed and
organised. Stirling doubted the truth in these claims and, although ‘probably
a little exaggerated’, were what one would expect from such an individual.74
Chilton predicted a victory for the right but said he could not be certain.
Whatever the result, the Foreign Office believed the election would only
answer two questions: who would win? And whether the losing side would
‘resort to violence’?75
Historians have suggested that in the months following the election of
the Popular Front government, British hostility towards the Republic
solidified. A recent argument is that ‘there was a prevailing belief, fanned
by the fiercely right-wing Ambassador Sir Henry Chilton … that in Spain
the victory of the Popular Front in February 1936 had signified the
beginning of a pre-revolutionary crisis’.76 In ‘despatch after despatch’,
Chilton ‘managed to convey the impression that the Popular Front cabinet
was the puppet of extreme left Socialists and Communists’. However, such
views of Chilton’s despatches are somewhat exaggerated. Although at times
over-emphasising communist influence in Spain, Chilton’s assessments of
the political situation between February and July 1936 contained more
nuance. In his first despatch in mid-February after the election, for
instance, he said the new government would ‘consist of men of fairly
moderate views’.77 He also predicted that Azaña as prime minister would
have a ‘fairly easy time for the next six to twelve months’. In late March, he
still would not entertain the possibility of a communist regime in Spain:
‘As the Spanish people do not desire a communist regime, I do not think
that such a form of government, if it is ever established, would be of long
duration’.78
The Foreign Office also did not place all blame for the deteriorating political
situation on anarchists and communists. Indeed, Western Department officials
frequently made distinctions between the political leanings of those who caused
disturbances and held right-wing groups and fascists responsible, too.79 Chilton
could not say whether Azaña had the situation under control but speculated that
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he might have been ‘allowing the lower classes to blow off some steam’ and
waiting for the opportunity for ‘suddenly calling a halt and restoring order once
more’.80 Certainly, this was not Azaña’s tactic, and continued disturbances led to
the proliferation of rumours of an impending communist revolution. To make
matters worse, these rumours prompted ones of a right-wingmilitary coup set to
take place before 12 April. The Foreign Office’s attitude towards the situation in
Spain was summed up by Evelyn Shuckburgh, a Western Department clerk
chiefly responsible for Spanish affairs, who noted that the situation was ‘dis-
turbing’, but ‘there is nothing we can do, except wait for the coup d’état, or the
revolution, or whatever is to come’.81
As the rumoured coup gradually appeared less likely, however, attention
soon shifted to the parliamentary crisis. Under the republican constitution, if
the president dissolved the government on more than one occasion within
a six-year period, the Cortes could decide whether the second dissolution had
been necessary. If the Cortes decided it unnecessary, it could remove the
president from office. As Alcalá-Zamora had dissolved the government in
October 1933 and again in January 1936, the Cortes met in April to discuss
the necessity of the dissolution and a majority subsequently voted to end his
tenure.82 Chilton believed that Azaña was the most likely replacement and
that Diego Martínez Barrio of the Radical Republican Party would become
prime minister. Barrio’s centrist politics led the Foreign Office to think that
having ‘Azaña as president and Barrio as prime minister would be a strong
combination’.83 Azaña became president on 10 May, but the role of prime
minister ultimately went to a Left Republican Party politician, Santiago
Casares Quiroga. Nevertheless, Chilton and the Foreign Office both consid-
ered this a satisfactory outcome. Chilton told his colleagues, ‘there might now
be some chance of a better maintenance of public order and the curbing of
the many demands of the proletariat’.84 Of Azaña, he said, ‘one hears nowa-
days, from mouths which but two months ago would have condemned him
unreservedly, suggestions that Señor Azaña is, at the moment, the only man
who can save Spain from anarchy or communism’.85 William Montagu-
Pollock, a Foreign Office official with experience in the Diplomatic Service,
concurred, noting, ‘there is a good chance that the Azaña-Quiroga combina-
tion, which should be a strong one, will succeed in restoring order; even if it
has to walk worriedly at first’.86
It is possible that Azaña would have prevented Spain from drifting into
civil war if right-wing groups had been willing to co-operate with the Popular
Front. The Foreign Office had even hoped that as Azaña’s government was
moderate, there might have been some passive support from right-wing
parties for the government’s efforts in maintaining order.87 In fact, Gil
Robles and most right-wing groups were opposed to the Popular Front
from the start and immediately began attempting to undermine it. Political
instability in Spain gave rise to further strikes and disturbances and, during
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the spring, the issue of law and order became the dominant theme in Cortes
debates. Politicians such as Gil Robles and José Calvo Sotelo, a member of
the monarchist Renovación Española, attempted to embarrass the govern-
ment and rally more opposition against it by reading out detailed lists of
incidents to highlight the Popular Front’s inability to maintain order.88
Azaña had in fact already taken responsibility for the disorder in Spain but
accused Gil Robles and Calvo Sotelo of conflating incidents perpetrated by
fascists and other right-wing groups with those of anarchists.89 Indeed, the
Popular Front government had been striving to maintain order through the
suppression of both left- and right-wing groups. Azaña warned Spaniards
and international observers that the fascist movement in Spain was not as
negligible as people might have thought, and the Foreign Office was inclined
to believe it.90 In April, for instance, Chilton told London of a conversation
he had with a friend with connexions to fascist groups in Spain. According to
this friend, these groups were not in a hurry to launch a coup because
‘recruits to fascism were flowing in thick and fast’ and ‘the actions of the
government were driving hundreds daily into the arms of fascism’.
Shuckburgh noted, ‘we have heard much of the communists’ activities; this
is the other side of the picture’.91
Chilton could substantiate this information based on some of his own
experiences in Spain. In May, for instance, he told the Foreign Office that
‘not without reason’, the government was seriously afraid of fascism. After
a recent drive between Zaragoza and Madrid, he wrote of ‘villagers unan-
imously [giving] the fascist salute as we passed. I did not see one clenched
fist’.92 Perhaps more alarming was the apparent widespread support in Spain
for fascist Italy’s conquest of Abyssinia. Antonio Goicoechea, leader of
Renovación Española, for example, sent a telegram to Benito Mussolini,
the Italian dictator, congratulating him on the entry of Italian troops into
Addis Ababa, the Abyssinian capital. The Italian ambassador at Madrid,
Orazio Pedrazzi, also published a statement in the Spanish press announcing
that it would be impossible to respond personally to the thousands of letters
he had received demonstrating support for the Italian conquest of
Abyssinia.93
Spaniards of the right were well aware of foreign perceptions of these links
between Spanish and Italian fascists. In June, plotters of the military rebellion
sent a representative to inform the British government that there would be
a coup in Spain within the next week. This informant claimed that ‘the head
of the Spanish army’ had sent him and wanted the British government to
know that the organisers of the coup were ‘anxious His Majesty’s
Government should know that it is not a fascist movement and anxious
not to be thought connected with Italian propaganda or interests’. The coup
was apparently strictly to restore order and place in power a ‘civilian right-
wing government’.94
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As the political situation continued to deteriorate, George Ogilvie-Forbes,
counsellor in the British Embassy at Madrid, suggested that the foreign
secretary, Anthony Eden, raise the issue with Augusto Barcía Trelles, the
Spanish foreign minister, at an upcoming League of Nations meeting at
Geneva. In preparation, Montagu-Pollock drew up a memorandum on
political developments in Spain since 1931 for Eden to read before departing
for Switzerland; it discussed the Spanish government’s apparent inability to
maintain order stating, ‘chances of parliamentary government are slight’.
However, it also asserted that a ‘fascist coup’ was very unlikely because the
Spanish Army was a ‘very uncertain element’ and left-wing feeling was ‘very
strong among the lower ranks’.95 Thus, just weeks before the outbreak of
civil war, Eden and the Foreign Office were far from certain that there
would be a coup in Spain and, should one come, doubted its chances of
success.
When the war did erupt in Spain, the situation remained unclear for some
days afterwards. Telephone lines were still functioning, but telegram com-
munications remained severely disrupted. Many British diplomatic staff in
Spain were on holiday, including Chilton in San Sebastián, on the north
coast. On the morning of 21 July, the Foreign Office received a telegram from
Chilton stating, ‘[the] general situation remains confused and reliable infor-
mation is not obtainable’.96 These obstacles to communication delayed
a Cabinet discussion of the civil war until 22 July. The summary of this
discussion, however brief or detailed it might have been, was only that the
‘situation remains unclear’ but should be ‘carefully watched’.97
It was the prospect of the civil war becoming internationalised and
exacerbating the ideological cleavages amongst other European nations that
led Baldwin’s government to opt decisively for neutrality within a week of the
outbreak of the conflict.98 Indeed, the first challenge came when the Spanish
government requested war material from France on 20 July, to which the
French government initially agreed.99 Between 23 and 25 July, the French
foreign minister, Yvon Delbos, and Prime Minister Léon Blum visited
London. Baldwin reportedly told Blum that if French intervention provoked
a conflict with Italy, his government would remain neutral.100 Just before
Blum returned to Paris, Eden apparently told him that if he went go ahead
and aided the Spanish government, he should ‘be cautious’.101
The day after the French delegation left London, Baldwin gave Eden
explicit instructions regarding Spain: ‘on no account, French or other, must
[you] bring us into a fight on the side of the Russians’.102 Some historians
have suggested this comment was a manifestation of Baldwin’s anti-
communism, reflecting his hostility towards the Spanish Republic and
a belief that it was on the cusp of falling victim to a Moscow-inspired
communist revolution.103 Rather than hostility specifically towards the
Spanish Republic, Baldwin’s instruction to Eden ties into his views more
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generally on foreign policy and the trajectory of Europe’s political polarisa-
tion. Baldwin had earlier predicted that soon ‘from the Rhine to the Pacific
there will be a people running into millions who have been trained to be
either Bolshevik robots or Nazi robots’.104 His fear at this stage was not so
much that Spain was about to fall to communism. A conflict between Italy
and France, provoked by French aid to the republican government, would
draw in the Soviet Union and Germany and further polarise Europe. In such
a conflict, Baldwin felt that a Franco-Soviet victory over Germany ‘would
probably only result in Germany going Bolshevik’.105 For him, communism
was only marginally worse than fascism, and he would therefore have been
content to leave ‘the Bolshies and the Nazis’ to fight each other.106 Indeed, as
he told the House of Commons in October 1936, ‘You have now on either
side [in Spain] large bodies of men who are prepared to fight and to die for
an abstract creed. That is a new feature since the War, and, to my mind, far
the most dangerous thing in this world today’.107
By considering Foreign Office perceptions of political developments in
Spain between 1931 and 1936, British responses to the outbreak of the civil
war come into focus not as an ideologically-driven attempt to facilitate the
overthrow of the Republic, but as responses to what the British government
perceived as a major threat to its foreign policy objectives. By summer 1936,
political divergence in Spain, combined with the ideological polarisation in
Europe more generally, ensured that the Spanish conflict was elevated almost
immediately into a primary British foreign policy consideration. Within this
context, there emerged the underlying motivations behind the British deci-
sion to remain neutral and in the enthusiastic acceptance and advocacy of the
Non-Intervention Agreement in August 1936.108
None of this suggests that the British response to the outbreak of the
Spanish Civil War in 1936 lacked the ideological antipathy on which other
historians have focused. It existed. However, understanding British diplo-
macy in Spain between 1931 and 1936 requires a more nuanced assessment
of official views of Spanish politics by incorporating an appreciation of
extreme right and fascist threats to stability. Until the outbreak of civil war,
the Foreign Office and British diplomats in Spain wanted to see a stable
government that could assimilate elements of both the left and right. This
attitude reflected the political consensus in Britain according to which
a government ought not to oppress the working class but incorporate it.
Doing so was a means of taming working class militancy to create political
stability. This hope for the Republic became increasingly difficult to maintain
after the Popular Front’s election in February 1936 but, in assessing Spain’s
political situation, the Foreign Office blamed instability and the irreconcil-
ability between the left and right on both extremes of the political spectrum,
not just the left.
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Of course, when an inclusive, stable, and democratic government was no
longer possible, many British politicians, diplomats, and Foreign Office officials
preferred a reactionary government and sympathised with the military rebels.
However, no consensus existed on the form of a desirable government based on
realistic assessments of the situation. Indeed, the surge of support for extreme
right and fascist groups in Spain, in addition to anarchist militancy, was
a microcosm of British concerns about the broader ideological polarisation
occurring in Europe at the time. Accordingly, the almost immediate internatio-
nalisation of the conflict ensured the British government opted for non-
intervention in anticipation of the dangers that the Spanish Civil War presented
to Europe’s status quo and reflected the British government’s weakness in
confronting dictatorships.
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